East India Company and Bank of England Shareholders during the South Sea Bubble: Partitions, Components and Connectivity in a Dynamic Trading Network by Andrew Mays & Gary S. Shea
CENTRE FOR DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
* Grateful appreciation goes to the British Academy for support in the research of this paper. 
Manuscript correspondence should be addressed to: Gary S. Shea, School of Economics and 
Finance, University of St. Andrews, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, UNITED KINGDOM. E-mail: 
gss2@st-andrews.ac.uk.  +44-(0)1334-462441 (office telephone) +44-(0)1334-462444 (office fax). 
 
CASTLECLIFFE, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, KY16 9AL 




East India Company and Bank of England 
Shareholders during the South Sea Bubble: 











  A new dataset, in the form of a network graph, is used to study inventory 
and trading behaviour amongst owners of East India Company (EIC) and Bank 
of England (BoE) stock around the South Sea Bubble. There was a decline in 
market intermediation in which the goldsmith bankers were dominant in 1720, 
but foreigners and Jews to some extent restored intermediation services after 
the Bubble. Company directors temporarily helped to sustain intermediation in 
1720 itself. Whereas before and during the Bubble intermediation was largely in 
the form of brokerage, after the Bubble dealership noticeably began to displace 
brokerage. 
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 1. Introduction 
The South Sea Bubble refers to the events in the year 1720 associated with an 
ambitious scheme to convert much of the British national debt into equity shares of 
the South Sea Company. The scheme that brought about these events and the events 
themselves have been recounted many times. The Bubble has been cast as an episode 
in Britain‟s larger Financial Revolution (Dickson, 1967) and the literature has been 
augmented also by Scott‟s (1910) account of the purely financial aspects of the South 
Sea scheme. Carswell (1993) did much to set the events of 1720 into their proper 
political setting and Neal (1990) has greatly helped us to understand the events of 
1720 in an international context. 
Foremost amongst the events associated with the South Sea Bubble is the stock 
market rise and fall that remains one of the most marked and remarked upon in 
history. We picture the market values for EIC standard shares from this period (Fig. 
1).
2 Hoppit (2002) has argued that much of the written history of the South Sea 
Bubble (but certainly excluding the original contributions cited above) has created 
and perpetuated mythologies about the events of 1720 instead of trying to make 
original contributions towards understanding these events and, in particular, has even 
strayed from “the discipline of counting” things that would be useful in understanding 
the South Sea Bubble. Carlos and Neal (2006) have done much to supply new things 
to count in their study of the microstructure of the markets in Bank of England 
(hereafter, BoE) shares in the period 1720-25. They pioneered the use of stock 
transaction data to study distributions of stock trading during and after the South Sea 
Bubble. Although their data pertained to stock balances and trade in shares in only 
                                                 
2 Like BoE shares, EIC shares did not change in definition in the 
period we study. In this, as in other studies, we refer to £100-
nominal stock as a standard share.   2 
one company, the BoE, theirs was a very large task because, outside of the South Sea 
Company itself, trade in BoE shares was probably the largest body of trade during the 
Bubble year of 1720. We extend their analyses to trade in another company‟s shares, 
shares in the East India Company (hereafter, EIC). The use of a previously 
unrecorded dataset
3 has enabled us to do this and the resulting database was structured 
so that it was capable of answering certain research questions that were incapable of 
being answering before. The primary difference between the structure of our database 
and the BoE database that inspired it is that in our database we can look at stock 
inventory behaviour on a day-by-day basis. We are now capable of examining the 
dynamic history of market trading and stock ownership in two stocks during the 











The most interesting research questions that have to be answered about the 
South Sea Bubble are, after all, about dynamic behaviour during the Bubble. Was 
                                                 
3 This is a digitised microfilm of India Office Records (IOR) 
L/AG/14/5/4, East India Company Stock Ledger, British Library. The 
construction of data from this manuscript is described in the 
Appendix A: Data Sources and Methods. This dataset formed the basis 






























































































Fig.1. EIC share prices, daily price quotations taken from Castaing and Freke.  3 
there a collective group or groups that were dominant in trade during the Bubble? 
Were the dominant traders a collection of the infamous stock-jobbers, the political 
classes or the goldsmith bankers themselves? Financial investment risk was certainly 
dynamic throughout the Bubble and now we can look at the joint riskiness of two 
stocks. Returns on EIC stock were riskier than were returns on BoE stock before, 
during and after the South Sea Bubble. Although it is unfortunately true that we 
cannot directly observe trade in the ultimately riskiest stock of all – South Sea 
Company shares – it will still be useful to see how people adjusted their investments 
between other risk classes. For example, we shall present evidence that the liquidity 
crisis of 1720 may have been associated with a flight to quality (from EIC stocks 
towards BoE stocks) carried out by persons who experienced the worst liquidity 
problems, the goldsmith bankers and brokers. 
The first empirical task therefore is to establish the general course of trade in 
EIC shares in contrast to what has already been documented for BoE trade by Carlos 
and Neal (2006). A second empirical task we perform is to establish the 
interpenetration of ownership in the two firms. Since shares in the two firms 
embodied different levels of risk, it would stand to reason that there should be some 
ownership of shares in common, if only for the sake of risk diversification. With these 
preliminary empirical tasks done we then proceed to see how the ownership of EIC 
and BoE shares can be analysed on a network. The network structure for the analysis 
is designed to serve several purposes. First the network is defined so that the usual 
questions that arise in network analysis, such as centrality, importance and 
connectivity can be meaningfully answered. Borgatti (2005) has argued that in much 
social network analysis these preliminary questions are inappropriately answered. The 
network setup should also be defined in a way that it helps us understand the events of   4 
1720 as an asset bubble. We shall show that this is the source of our pre-occupation 
with analysing stock inventory behaviour in a network. It is also why we conduct 
much of our analysis on a time-series of network subgraphs so that we can obtain a 
perspective on how network structure dynamically changes. Along with a way of 
doing dynamic network analysis, we use social affiliation data to show how we can 
partition our networks and demonstrate the social dimension of investor behaviour as 
well. 
 
2. The South Sea Bubble and the East India Company 
 
It is important to set the historical background of the South Sea Bubble and the EIC‟s 
position within it. The South Sea Company was set up in 1711 with a capital stock of 
more than £9  million. It was created in order to buy existing short-term government 
debt and to help manage the national debt in a way similar to that followed by the 
BoE. In addition to this role, the Company purposed to trade with the Spanish Empire 
(Section V. A., Scott, 1910). By some persons Spanish America was seen as a more 
promising trade area than was India and the Far East, as it was more accessible and 
the customers were more likely to purchase traditional English exports such as cloth 
and iron goods. For Spanish colonists ordinary trade with any country except Spain 
was strictly forbidden, but after the conclusion of the Treaty of Utrecht (1712), the 
South Sea Company was given sole rights to carry on British trade with Spanish 
America – the so-called South Seas. The South Sea Company had also obtained for 30 
years the Asiento de Negros, a contract to be the sole supplier of slaves to the South 
Seas. Britain already had colonies in the Caribbean and, as a result, had a large share   5 
of the slave trading market in the Western Hemisphere. The Company certainly 
looked to be well positioned in this fruitful new market. 
By the autumn of 1719, however, a new war with Spain had halted the 
Company‟s South Sea trade. Unlike the EIC, with its strong Asian trade, and the BoE, 
with its home-counties banking monopoly, the South Sea Company had little room for 
action. The South Sea Company‟s proposed escape from this dilemma was to yet 
again attempt a conversion of government debt obligations into new equity shares in 
the Company. The scale of the proposed scheme was, however, unprecedented, except 
to the extent that it was inspired by the Law System in France. By the end of 1719 
John Law had successfully converted the entire French national debt into shares of the 
newly formed Compagnie des Indes, which monopolistically combined national 
banking, tax-collection and overseas trading into one large firm. Some of the 
grandiosity of the Law System was evident in the proposals first put forward 
tentatively by the South Sea Company. In these proposals the idea was tried that the 
South Sea Company too would attempt to convert the entire British national debt into 
South Sea shares. It was in this regard that the South Sea scheme first touched against 
the affairs of the East India Company and the Bank of England (Dickson, 1967). The 
EIC and the BoE, like the South Sea Company, were both „great monied‟ companies, 
that is, both had made large loans to the government and indeed were required to do 
so to justify their chartered existences. A South Sea Company proposal to exchange 
the entire national debt for South Sea shares would ultimately have become a threat to 
the chartered existence of the other two companies. For reasons that are 
undocumented, but can be reasonably inferred from events, the South Sea scheme 
eventually developed into a plan to convert the remaining national debt into South Sea 
shares, but exclusive of the debt that was already in the hands of the EIC and the BoE.   6 
From this time forward until the South Sea scheme collapsed, the EIC no longer 
figured in proposed re-arrangements of the national debt. 
So, in 1720 the EIC was merely affected by events more than it tried to shape 
events. The Company‟s historian stated that the EIC‟s  Directorate 
“remained relatively passive while the South Sea Bubble was reaching its climax and 
the Court merely instructed the Indian Councils to be on their guard against the 
powerful competition posed by the second French Compagnie des Indes”.
10 
 
The EIC was a bit more energetic in business than was suggested by the quote above. 
It did at least explore the possibility that it might trade slaves from Madagascar to the 
Western Hemisphere. While the South Sea Company was trying to put its own slave-
trading business afoot by contracting with the Royal African Company to supply it 
with slaves from West Africa (Davies, 1957), the EIC considered that it might supply 
slaves directly to British colonies. Several plans that could have effected an EIC slave 
trade fell to the wayside, primarily because of Parliament‟s disapproval of them (Platt, 
1969). In the normal course of business the EIC Directors were concerned enough 
with the outfitting of trading voyages and with the collection of bullion that would 
have to be carried by these voyages to the Far East. The latter task became their 
greatest worry by the early autumn of 1720 and into 1721. By the middle of 
September 1720 the directors of the BoE and the EIC met to discuss the scarcity of 
credit that had developed in London. By the end of the month “an international crisis 
was developing with full force” and in 1721 that “the description of the winter events 
written by the EIC’s Committee of Correspondence in February contains all the 
ingredients of a classic liquidity crisis”.
4 
The previous years of careful management and a conservative dividend policy 
had put the EIC in a position so that it could absorb the blows experienced in 1720. 
                                                 
4 Chaudhuri (p.447, 1978).   7 
There was a reserve provided by the undistributed portions of good profits that were 
earned between 1710 and 1716. The company certainly continued to trade through 
and after the Bubble. Although it had more than the usual difficulties in financing its 
voyages, after 1722 the crisis had passed. There were some losses on trade in 1721 
and 1722 that caused a decline in cash reserves for two years, but it was not till 1723 
that the dividend rate was lowered, in line with falling interest rates. The years 1717-
1727 did mark a volatile time for the EIC, but in the six years from 1727 the company 
saw an average increase of 14.5 p.c. in profits.
5 Thus did the EIC experience and 
survive the rigours of the Bubble year. Its shares remained prominently traded public 
securities. It was not directly involved in the South Sea scheme and its business was 
exposed to trade credit risks that differed from those faced by the BoE and the South 
Sea Company. The structure and the dynamics of the trade in its equity thus does need 
to be examined and contrasted with the trade in BoE shares. The data and methods 
that we use are described in the next section. 
 
3. Data and methods 
The research questions that network data can address depend upon how networks are 
defined. To address questions with respect to financial intermediation there is required 
a network structure that can, at the very least, describe financial intermediation as a 
network feature – mostly likely as a flow. It then should also be possible to describe 
global and local features of that network in terms of such flows and other features or 
relevance to the analyst. 
The sources for our data and the resulting network data structure that we 
employ are described in detail in Appendix A. The fundamental data structure we use 
                                                 
5 Chaudhuri (p. 445, 1978).   8 
is illustrated in Fig. 2 with an exemplary 3-node network graph. The directed edges 
between the nodes (representing sellers and buyers) indicate sales. Edges in the 
graphs have also other time-changing (mutable) attributes. Each edge, of course, has a 
date of sale associated with it, the respective ID numbers of the buyer and seller, as 
well as the type of stock transacted (EIC or BoE). We have also been able to calculate 
the size of stock inventories held by each buyer and seller. The network node 
attributes are recorded as [0-1]-binary data and the figure illustrates the kinds of node 














Graph partitions refer to subgraphs that are defined in terms of the binary node 
attributes. For example, we can split our graph into two partitions in which the nodes 
                                                 
6 The data structure described here is that prescribed by the 
Networkx network analysis programs. Networkx programs are written in 
Python and we have used Networkx 1.3 and have written our own Python 
shells for Networkx programs using Python 2.6.6. See 
http://networkx.lanl.gov/ and http://www.python.org/ for information 
on these programming tools. 
Fig. 2. Fundamental structure of network data for stock trading. 
Edge Attributes (mutable): ID Buyer; Nominal purchase/sale {weight}; 
Type of Stock transacted (BoE, EIC); ID Seller; Buyer Inventories: Seller 
Inventories: Date of purchase/sale
Node Attributes (immutable): ID number; gender; nationality; residence; 
social class; economic class; political class, etc.  9 
are respectively male and female in gender or in which the nodes are respectively 
British and Non-British in residence. Components too are subgraphs, but they are 
defined in terms of rules based upon edge attributes. The basic example of a 
component subgraph is one which is defined in terms of its connectivity. For example, 
all the nodes that are connected to just one other node can represent one such 
subgraph and all the nodes that connect to no other nodes can define another subgraph. 
We do much of our analyses on the largest connected components of our graph data – 
the largest subgraphs (in numbers of nodes) in which all nodes are connected either 
directly or indirectly to each other. Also of special interest to us are the subgraphs 
defined in terms of the dates that are associated with the graph edges. These are the 
graph components we study when we investigate how network structure changes 
through time. A device we use throughout this paper is the subgraph defined by edge-
dates that fall within a 3-month range of dates. A monthly series of such graphs and 
their characteristics can be used to create what amounts to moving-average trends in 
network characteristics. 
Empirical and theoretical economists increasingly employ network graphs in 
their analyses. Easley and Kleinberg (2010) show how networks can be useful in 
describing the organisation of a theoretical economic game, an auction market or a 
voting system and how network graphs can act as a framework for understanding the 
complexities that can result from the interactions of numerous actors. In the 
organisation of a formal market exchange, for example, members of the exchange 
voluntarily organise themselves into such a network. At any particular time, however, 
the trading activity within the exchange may follow paths and patterns that reflect 
only a subset of the features of that network. Furthermore, analysis of network data 
may reveal features of an underlying network from which the data are generated, but   10 
it is by no means clear that deterministic algorithms are the best ways to reveal them 
or whether a statistical approach is more appropriate. Without guidance from a theory 
that explains the existence of the network in the first place it is difficult to know how 
to build a network dataset. The relationships between networks that shape economic 
behaviour, which may be difficult to observe, and more observable networks that are 
the results of that behaviour is a theme in the social network analysis of markets 
(Podolny, 2001). So, in this spirit, we now try to discover the fundamental data 
structure is best suited to the study financial intermediation phenomena.
7 
We start by considering the following questions. What happened to financial 
intermediates throughout the period of the South Sea Bubble and how can it be related 
to connectivity in network data? Did connectivity rise or fall and did the timing of any 
such changes coincide closely with other events in the markets? In many network 
analyses the basic quantum in measuring connectivity is node degree centrality. Node 
degree refers to the number of network edges that connect to a node. The concept can 
be extended to networks with trade-weighted edges and thus we can define the degree 
of a node as the trade-weighted number or sum of network edges that connect to a 
node. The importance, or centrality, of a node can be measured as the proportion of all 
network nodes that are connected to the node in question. The central distribution 
measure of network node importance is average degree centrality.
8 When average 
degree centrality is then calculated for a series of monthly subgraphs, we have a time-
series description of changing network structure. For a partition of our data into trade 
in EIC and BoE shares, average degree centrality through time is pictured in Fig. 3. 
                                                 
7 Shea (Section 1, 2011) discusses which data structures are ideal in 
describing financial intermediation on a network in the study of 
asset bubbles. 
8 The best introductions to these concepts are Sections 6.9 and 7.1 
in Newman (2010). For an entire directed graph or connected component 
average in-degree and out-degree centrality must be the same, which 














An interpretation of Fig. 3 with respect to financial intermediation, however, is 
subject to pitfalls. Troughs in average degree centrality correspond with the peak in 
the South Sea Bubble, to be sure, but we know that this trough cannot coincide with a 
decline in the frequency of trade. Both for EIC stock (see Fig. 4 in the next section) 
and for BoE stock (see Fig. 2, Carlos and Neal, 2006) overall frequency of trade 
increased at the peak of the Bubble. Average frequency of trade went up during the 
Bubble, but Fig. 3 shows that average frequency of trade per trading person 
(connected node) went down. Financial intermediaries may have well remained as 
well connected as they were before, but the peak of the Bubble might have been 
















































































































Fig. 3. Average degree centrality for nodes in a monthly series of 3-month subgraphs of trade in 
BoE and EIC shares.  12 
traded little or not at all thereafter. Frequency of trades thus might be a very 
misleading way of looking at connectivity for financial intermediaries.
9 
Borgatti (2005) has argued that connectivity and centrality measures do 
certainly have to be chosen and tailored in response to different characteristics of 
networks, in particular, with regard to the kinds of flows that travel across edges. 
Such is the case in our networks. Trade in shares, like exchange of money, will follow 
walks through a network, but do not generally follow paths. Trade in shares does not 
diffuse through a network as would the spread of rumour, gossip or infection. Nor 
does share trading tend to follow shortest paths through a network as would the 
optimal delivery of packages.
10 Additionally, stock and money flows, are not 
continuous; they tend to stop and re-start and thus they tend to accumulate at nodes 
and then also tend to dissipate away from nodes. Surely measures based upon 
frequency of trade without reference to previous net trade will miss out an important 
element of explaining financial intermediation. We argue later in this paper that 
inventory dynamics are one of the most interesting new things that we can measure 
with regard to the South Sea Bubble because it fits well with recent theorising about 
the connection between inventories and market liquidity. Given the particular nature 
                                                 
9 Carlos, Maguire and Neal (2008) have used centrality and 
betweenness measures based upon frequency of trade to deduce 
importance and strength of ties between trading nodes. The same 
approach is taken in Carlos, Neal and Wandschneider(2007). The sums 
of a node’s trade weights is the appropriate extension of the idea of 
node degree in weighted networks, but that would still not remove the 
problem of interpreting figures such as Fig. 3 because the per-trade 
size stock trade was generally changing throughout the Bubble years. 
In the case of EIC trade, see Fig. 5. In the case of BoE trade, see 
Table 1, Carlos and Neal (2006). 
10 The differences between paths, trails, walks and diffusions in 
network graphs are discussed in any elementary text on graph theory, 
but are well explained by Newman’s (2010). In one instance of their 
analysis, Carlos, Neal and Wandschneider(Table 6b, 2007), rank trader 
(node)importance in terms of betweenness on geodesic (shortest)paths, 
but since shares are homogeneous goods and are not unique delivery 
packages, paths are not an appropriate to describe share transfers 
though a network.   13 
of share trades as flows, we want to take some care in building network measures 
appropriate for these flows and it is clear that measures based upon frequency of trade 
(whether weighted by size of trades or not so weighted) can be misleading and are at 
best only a limited start to answering questions about connectivity in stock markets. 
In another paper (Shea, 2011) measures of network flows that can be related to 
inventory behaviour are defined. These measures are more appropriate in addressing 
questions with respect to financial intermediation, which is the subject of Section 9. 
Three concepts are key: 
Pass-Through (PT): The total sum of flows that pass through the hands of 
trader (per unit of time) is another way of measuring flows. It will certainly be a 
positive of function of edge weights (size of sales) and frequency of trade. The words 
„pass through‟ connote flows that simply pass through a trader‟s hands and do not 
contribute to or detract from inventories. PT relative to the accumulation of 
inventories is a way of measuring the extent to which flows tend to stop and start in a 
network.
11 The ratio of PT to total sales in the network is also one measure, but not a 
complete measure, of market intermediation. EIC share markets were more highly 
intermediated than were BoE share markets, but it appears that intermediation in both 
markets declined after 1720 (Fig. 16 and Fig. 2 , Shea, 2011). 
Core Pass-Through (CPT): CPT connects all traders who facilitate PT with 
other traders who also facilitate PT. CPT is therefore confined to the largest connected 
component of the network in terms of PT flows. The ratio of CPT to PT is another 
measure of intermediation, what we might call the density of intermediation. For 
example, in one interpretation, the more fully trade within a network passes through 
intermediaries who themselves tend to trade with other intermediaries, the more fully 
                                                 
11 Average stopping times for flows are also calculable, but do not 
yet figure in our analyses.   14 
markets are interconnected by informed or influential traders. In such densely 
informed intermediation we would expect that a high proportion of PT would be CPT. 
Nearly 100 percent of all EIC PT was CPT, whereas BoE CPT varied between 20 
percent and 80 percent of PT. EIC markets were generally more densely 
intermediated than were BoE stock markets. 
Brokerage versus Dealership: Two flavours of financial intermediation are 
naturally measurable in our framework. The broker is a trader who facilitates trade 
(PT) with little or no inventory. The dealer is the trader who facilitates trade and 
possesses relatively large inventories (Fig. 9, Shea, 2011). In 1719 the stock markets 
for EIC and BoE stocks were highly brokered markets, but in 1721 became markets in 
which dealers were increasingly important. 
 
4. The general course of trade in East India Company shares 
The tables and figures presented in this section will establish the extent to which trade 
in EIC shares was directly comparable to trade that was simultaneously taking place 
in BoE shares. In 1719 and 1720 the ownership of the Company was spread over 
about 1700 account holders. Into 1721 and 1722, however, the ownership was spread 
over more than 1850 account holders and by 1723 there were more than 1900 account 
holders (Table 1). Between March 1719 and March 1723 there were recorded over 
3635 separate stock accounts. Between September 1720 and September 1725, there 
were recorded more than 7,900 such BoE accounts (Carlos and Neal, 2006). 
As should be expected, trade in shares was especially heavy in 1720. The 
nominal equity capital of the BoE, which was £ 5.56 million, turned over a bit more 
than once in the 1720 trading year. Trade in EIC shares was more intense than that. 
The nominal equity capital of the EIC was £ 3.2 million, but in 1720 total nominal   15 
trade in its shares was nearly £ 5 million. This trade was confined to nearly 4,900 
transfers over the whole year. In the two years on either side of 1720 roughly 75 
percent of shareholders did not transfer any of their shares. In the Bubble year of 1720, 
however, more than 50 percent of shareholders were involved in transfers and once 
persons were involved in either sales or purchases, they engaged in more transfers on 
average in 1720 than they did in other years (Table 1). 
As was the case for the BoE, we can clearly document the relative intensity of 
trade in the Bubble year (Fig. 4). Since numbers of transfers of shares were absolutely 
fewer in number than the BoE transfers analysed by Carlos and Neal, the relatively 
high turnover in EIC shares was achieved through transfers of larger size than was 
typically the case for BoE trade. If the reader looks to Carlos and Neal‟s Table 1 and 
compares it to Fig. 5, one can readily confirm that East India transfer sizes tended to 
Table 1 
Numbers and Percents of EIC Transfers by Block Size and Time Period 
Block Size £    4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723 
0-99    9  57  36  39  141 
100-199    41  254  172  165  632 
200-299    30  244  157  119  550 
300-399    29  127  108  65  329 
400-499    14  61  35  37  147 
500-999    432  1846  743  693  3714 
1000-1499    683  1586  364  338  2971 
1500-1999    37  140  42  33  252 
2000-2499    170  333  48  37  588 
2500-2999    17  31  15  8  71 
3000-4999    76  119  44  24  263 
5000+    49  99  22  18  188 
Total    1587  4897  1786  1576  9846 
             
Block Size £    4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723 
0-99    0.6%  1.2%  2.0%  2.5%  1.4% 
100-199    2.6%  5.2%  9.6%  10.5%  6.4% 
200-299    1.9%  5.0%  8.8%  7.6%  5.6% 
300-399    1.8%  2.6%  6.0%  4.1%  3.3% 
400-499    0.9%  1.2%  2.0%  2.3%  1.5% 
500-999    27.2%  37.7%  41.6%  44.0%  37.7% 
1000-1499    43.0%  32.4%  20.4%  21.4%  30.2% 
1500-1999    2.3%  2.9%  2.4%  2.1%  2.6% 
2000-2499    10.7%  6.8%  2.7%  2.3%  6.0% 
2500-2999    1.1%  0.6%  0.8%  0.5%  0.7% 
3000-4999    4.8%  2.4%  2.5%  1.5%  2.7% 
5000+    3.1%  2.0%  1.2%  1.1%  1.9%   16 
be larger than those for the BoE. In terms of the block size of trades, our Table 1 
conveys the same information.
12 It is particularly noticeable that block trade in the 
£1000-£1500 category was well represented in East India trade in all periods, but was 











Also in conformity with the results of Table 3 in Carlos and Neal (2006), we 
find that the majority of sellers and buyers in all periods transferred stock only once 
or twice. For the majority of stock traders, the South Sea Bubble period could hardly 
be described as a period of continued and frenzied trading activity. In Table 2 we see 
that in 1720, of all buyers and sellers, those who bought or sold more than a 6 times 
accounted for only about 10 percent of all traders. In conformity too with Carlos and 
Neal‟s Table 4, we find in our Table 3 that the distribution of transfers by size was 
uniform between buyers and sellers. Although we find that EIC shareholders traded 
more frequently and in slightly larger block sizes than did BoE shareholders, there are 
very many other similarities between the trading histories of shareholders in the two 
                                                 
 









4/1719 7/1720 10/1721 1/1723
Fig. 4. Monthly Numbers of East India Shares Transferred.  17 
firms. Most buyers and sellers, particularly if they were small buyers and sellers, 
traded infrequently so that large portions of both companies‟ share ownership was 
quite stable, even through the South Sea Bubble period. If the share-ownerships in the 
two firms consisted of largely the same groups of people, this might go some way in 
explaining why their trading behaviours are so similar. In the next section we look at 
the distributions of EIC shareholdings through time and what they had in common 











4/1719 7/1720 10/1721 1/1723
Fig. 5. East India monthly nominal value per transfer.  18 
Table 2 
Numbers of Unique EIC Sellers and Buyers by Numbers of Transactions 
  Unique sellers (Number)    Unique buyers (Number) 
Number of Transactions  4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723    4/1719-3/1723  4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723 
0    1265  841  1375  1405    586  1242  885  1323  1366  600 
1  336  716  368  432    1125  342  829  535  510  1386 
2  87  274  113  122    432  91  214  120  112  425 
3  48  122  47  63    199  43  115  55  60  206 
4  23  58  31  23    125  15  58  18  26  126 
5  22  44  20  19    85  19  41  20  16  90 
6  6  24  8  12    50  11  21  12  9  52 
7  7  17  6  9    38  7  22  5  11  48 
8  3  14  7  6    35  6  16  1  3  21 
9  3  19  2  2    22  3  16  8  6  14 
10  5  9  3  4    22  3  9  4  2  18 
11  1  6  2  3    13  1  15  1  1  12 
12  3  9  1  1    8  2  8  2  1  15 
13  3  5  1  2    7  1  5  3  4  10 
14  0  5  1  2    15  2  4  2  2  10 
15+  12  60  21  8    116  12  53  17  7  110 
Sum Sellers/Buyers (with 
1 or more transactions) 
559  1382  631  708    2292  558  1426  803  770  2543 
  Number Owners, Beginning of Year    Number Owners, End of Year 
  1714  1694  1846  1969    1714    1694  1846  1969  1995  1995 
 Percentage of Owners who never sold  Percentage of Owners who never bought 
    73.8%  49.6%  74.5%  71.4%    34.2%    73.3%  47.9%  67.2%  68.5%  30.1% 
                             
  Average Number of transactions per seller  Average Number of transactions per buyer 
    2.3  2.8  2.4  2.1    3.1    2.3  2.7  2.1  2.0    2.8 
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Table 3 
Unique EIC Sellers and Buyers by Largest Transactions 
    Unique Sellers (Number)  Unique Buyers (Number) 
Block Size £    4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723  4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723 
0-99    4  11  12  17  38  4  10  17  7  25 
100-199    18  66  60  61  172  26  106  83  100  215 
200-299    14  79  57  60  169  8  91  89  61  187 
300-399    15  46  45  34  116  16  38  52  33  100 
400-499    5  23  10  16  46  6  21  17  23  50 
500-999    164  434  214  258  808  150  437  264  283  784 
1000-1499    180  398  131  169  573  191  414  161  170  631 
1500-1999    22  57  21  21  80  22  58  30  22  99 
2000-2499    67  139  26  27  133  65  120  30  28  198 
2500-2999    7  18  9  5  21  7  16  8  7  34 
3000-4999    33  52  29  22  75  38  53  34  19  119 
5000+    30  59  17  18  61  25  62  18  17  101 
Total    559  1382  631  708  2292  558  1426  803  770  2543 
                       
Block Size £    4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723  4/1719-12/1719  1720  1721  1722-3/1723  4/1719-3/1723 
0-99    0.7%  0.8%  1.9%  2.4%  1.7%  0.7%  0.7%  2.1%  0.9%  1.0% 
100-199    3.2%  4.8%  9.5%  8.6%  7.5%  4.7%  7.4%  10.3%  13.0%  8.5% 
200-299    2.5%  5.7%  9.0%  8.5%  7.4%  1.4%  6.4%  11.1%  7.9%  7.4% 
300-399    2.7%  3.3%  7.1%  4.8%  5.1%  2.9%  2.7%  6.5%  4.3%  3.9% 
400-499    0.9%  1.7%  1.6%  2.3%  2.0%  1.1%  1.5%  2.1%  3.0%  2.0% 
500-999    29.3%  31.4%  33.9%  36.4%  35.3%  26.9%  30.6%  32.9%  36.8%  30.8% 
1000-1499    32.2%  28.8%  20.8%  23.9%  25.0%  34.2%  29.0%  20.0%  22.1%  24.8% 
1500-1999    3.9%  4.1%  3.3%  3.0%  3.5%  3.9%  4.1%  3.7%  2.9%  3.9% 
2000-2499    12.0%  10.1%  4.1%  3.8%  5.8%  11.6%  8.4%  3.7%  3.6%  7.8% 
2500-2999    1.3%  1.3%  1.4%  0.7%  0.9%  1.3%  1.1%  1.0%  0.9%  1.3% 
3000-4999    5.9%  3.8%  4.6%  3.1%  3.3%  6.8%  3.7%  4.2%  2.5%  4.7% 
5000+    5.4%  4.3%  2.7%  2.5%  2.7%  4.5%  4.3%  2.2%  2.2%  4.0%   20 
5. The interpenetration of share ownerships in the EIC and the BoE 
 
What possibilities are before the researcher who would like to investigate portfolio 
behaviour during the South Sea Bubble? Of the two methods that could be followed, 
both are severely limited by lack of data. For one, we could look directly at 
individuals‟ investment portfolios. Details of personal and institutional investments 
can occasionally appear in archives, but they are hardly representative of the 
investments of the typical investor in 1720. Archives usually contain investment 
records of only prominent individuals or institutions.
13 Such records are usually also 
frustratingly incomplete.  The other approach is to look at the financial records of 
companies to survey what investment had been made in them. The survival of these 
records too was heavily affected by the survival of the companies themselves. We 
have financial ledgers of only the EIC, the BoE and only part of the ledgers for the 
Royal African Company. Records of other companies, either projected or already 
established in 1720, have generally not survived. 
The records of equity ownership in the EIC and BoE, however, are highly 
complete. If we merge together these two datasets we can at least make a start in 
describing how investment and trading behaviour played out in the South Sea Bubble. 
BoE and EIC share values mirrored to some degree the great boom in prices 
experienced by shares in the South Sea Company. From 1719 until midsummer 1720, 
when they experienced their peak values, EIC share values remained about 1.5 times 
to 2 times the size of BoE shares values, while at the same time South Sea shares 
                                                 
13 The portfolio activities of Hoare’s Bank are one example that has 
been studied by Temin and Voth (2004). The portfolio activities of 
the first Duke of Portland are yet another example recently studied 
by Shea (2009). Neither Hoare’s Bank nor the Duke of Portland, 
however, would even faintly resemble the typical investor in the 
1720s.   21 
values quickly became twice as valuable as EIC shares themselves.
14 But even though 
the rise and crash in share values were more weakly reflected in EIC and BoE share 
values, we know that these shares would have been held and traded simultaneously 
with South Sea shares by many people. Many of the actors in the market for South 
Sea shares would have participated in the share markets for other established 
companies. 
The benefits in terms of total return risk reduction would not have been small 
for people who held even just the two EIC and BoE stocks. Since over the entire 
period 1719-21 there was considerable risk of return to both EIC and BoE stocks (1.9 
p.c.p.d. for EIC stocks and 1.7 p.c.p.d. for BoE stocks), considerable reductions in 
total risk of return would accrue to anyone who held one stock along with the other. 
The correlation in daily returns on the two stocks averaged about 0.5, so that holding 
equal quantities, for example, of both stocks would have a total return risk of 1.6 
p.c.p.d.; that would amount to a near 32 p.c. reduction in total return risk with respect 
to holding EIC stocks alone and a near 18 p.c. reduction in total return risk with 
respect to holding BoE stocks alone. The correlation between returns in EIC and BoE 
stock also tended to weaken throughout our period; in 1719 the correlation was higher 
than 0.6, but in 1720 the correlation dropped to 0.5 and in 1722 the correlation was 
about 0.4 between the two returns, so that the benefits to diversification actually 
strengthened throughout the Bubble period. Benefits to diversification, although 
ultimately limited by the small numbers of different stock investments available, were 
marginally quite significant. It behooves us therefore to examine the distributions of 
joint share ownerships in EIC and BoE shares. 
                                                 
14 See Fig. 1 (Hoppit, 2002) and Fig. 1 (Shea, 2011).   22 
The ownerships of the two companies had large overlaps with each other. We 
have already described the extent to which share ownership in the EIC changed 
between 1719 and 1723. Whereas £ 3.2 million stock was spread over about 1700 
owners in 1719/20, by 1723 there were about 1900 owners of he company‟s stock. A 
similar change in the ownership of BoE equity took place between 1719 and 1721 
when the numbers of shareholders increased from about 3400 to 3600. Starting in 
1719 there were about 700 account owners and, by 1721, there were about 760 
account owners who appeared in both companies‟ ledgers. 
The common owners of these two companies tended to be large shareholders 
and their large collective claims on the companies‟ assets appear to have been quite 
stable throughout the South Sea episode. The lower panels in Fig. 6 illustrate the 
stability in the relative numbers of owners who owned stock in both of the companies; 
at any time; about 20 percent of those persons who owned BoE stock also owned EIC 
stock and 40 percent of persons who owned EIC stock also owned BoE stock. We can 
see in the upper panels of Fig. 6, however, that owners of BoE stock possessed a near 
60 percent claim on EIC equity, while owners of EIC stock possessed a 40 percent 
claim upon BoE equity. We cannot conclude from these observations, however, that 
BoE shareholders were somehow more likely to invest in other equities; BoE 
shareholders were, after all, more numerous and BoE equity was larger than that of 
the EIC. We have to look a little more closely at the finer details of the joint 
ownership of the two firms. 
People who invested in both EIC and BoE shares clearly tended to be larger 
investors than East India and BoE shareholders in general. But how large were they 
relative to the general run of investors in the two companies? Figs. 7 and 8 show that, 
conditional upon being a shareholder in both firms, large BoE shareholders were only   23 
marginally more likely to be large shareholders in the EIC than large EIC 
shareholders were likely to be BoE large shareholders. In Table 4 we also see that the 
correlation between the sizes of stockholdings amongst owners of both EIC and BoE 
stock was quite positive. 
We are of course looking at the cross-holdings of only two stocks, so it might 
seem a bit heroic to draw conclusions about portfolio behaviour from the tables and 
figures presented so far. On the other hand, it is fair to remind the reader that EIC and 
BoE stocks, along with South Sea stocks, did account for more than 90 percent of 
total equity capital whose market values were regularly listed in the financial press in 
the 1720s. Investors had few enough uses to which they could put their savings; they 
could invest in marketable government debt, but available corporate equity 
investments that were also readily tradable were uncommon. In that light, the cross-
holdings of EIC and BoE stocks are significant. In Table 4 we see a distinct break in 
the pattern of cross-holdings above the £ 2000 qualification for being a director in 
either company. The largest stock holders (x≥£ 3000) were strongly likely be the 
largest stock holders in the other firm as well, but from £ 2000 up to £ 3000 stock 
holdings, the positive correlation appears to be weaker; individuals who just qualified 
for directorship in one firm were still likely to hold large amounts of stock in the other 
firm, but were not likely to try own so much as to qualify for directorship in that firm. 
It is understandable that persons who wished to qualify for directorships were not 
likely to want to qualify for directorships in both companies given conflicts of interest 
and simple constraints on their own time. Below the £ 2000-levelings cross-holdings 
of stocks cross-holdings most likely were equal in size. Although there are clear 
indications that qualification for directorships was an influence in cross-holdings   24 
amongst the largest shareholders, joint holders of shares generally held shares in both 
companies in roughly equal quantities. 
What appears in the figures and tables raises interesting questions with regard to 
portfolio behaviour and attitudes towards risk during the South Sea Bubble. We 
tentatively conclude that the benefits of diversification were more frequently enjoyed 
by larger shareholders and this tendency was perhaps greater than even is obvious in 
our data to the extent that some shareholders were attracted to large shareholdings in 
just one firm in order to qualify for a directorship. There is no obvious reason why the 
benefits of diversification across tradable investments should not be more uniformly 
distributed on the size of shareholdings. If size of shareholdings is a proxy for wealth, 
then this perhaps points the way toward modelling of risk aversion. We can 
supplement our results by adding further data to our database. The cross-holdings 
between EIC, BoE and Royal African shareholders are a possibility, but we delay this 
for another study. 
A feature of these figures and table that stands out is that, again, there is 
remarkable constancy in the relative distributions of share ownership by size. Apart 
from the barely noticeable increase in concentration of ownership in large accounts in 
1720, as compared to the year before and after, and apart from the fact that the 
numbers of accounts appeared to decline a bit into 1720, but then seemed to 
permanently rise in number by 1721, we would not know how to relate features of 
these figures with the events of 1720. Indeed, without knowledge that the Bubble had 
occurred, it would not be possible to infer from these figures that anything peculiar 
had happened in 1720 at all. There is also the possibility, however, that trade was 
proceeding in such a way to disguise any turbulence in ownership patterns in the 
distributions we have presented so far. If large account holders were being replaced   25 
by other large account holders and small account holders were being replaced by 
other small account holders, such changes in ownership would simply not be apparent 
in Figs. 6 through 8. It is more probable, however, that the seeming stability was due 
to the fact that most stock accounts were nontrading accounts; Shea (Fig. 7 , 2011) 
has shown that the relative size of inventory holdings for active buyers and sellers 
radically changed prior to and during the Bubble, but these changes were not large 
enough or widespread enough to have an affect on the stability apparent in Figs. 6 
through 8. 
In the remainder of this paper we shall reveal the more radical changes that took 
place in stock ownership and trade. We do this by partitioning our network data on the 
basis of important social and professional characteristics of stock owners. Historians 
have already pointed the way to the groups that would be most fruitful on which to 
base network partitions: 1) the goldsmith bankers and brokers; 2) EIC and BoE 
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Fig. 6. Cross-ownership of Bank of England (BoE) and East India Company (EIC) shares by amounts of stock and numbers of shareholders.
Notes: The figures present percentage decompositions of ownerships. In the upper left-hand panel a constant £ 5.6 million in equity ownership in BoE stock is divided 
into the two groups - one group that owns BoE stock exclusively and another group that also owns EIC stock. In the upper right-hand panel the same decomposition 
is applied to the owners of £ 3.2 million EIC stock - those who own EIC stock exclusively and those who also own BoE stock. In the lower two panels  percentage 
decompositions of the numbers of shareholders are presented. The numbers of shareholders for both companies are not constant, but increase modestly over time.  27 
Fig. 7. East India Company (EIC) stock ownership distributions by size of ownerships.
Notes: x represents the amount of nominal stock credited to an account. The upper panels (A and C) show  the numbers of accounts the contain stocks that fall within 
certain bands. The lower panels (B and D) show the shares of accounts within these bands as percentages of stock issued and outstanding. Panel A shows the 
distribution by size for all EIC shareholder accounts and Panel B shows the percentage distribution by size for all EIC accounts.  Panel C shows the distribution by size 
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Fig. 8. Bank of England (BoE) stock ownership distributions by size of ownerships.
Notes: See definitions in notes for Fig. 7.
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Table 4 
Conditional Percentage Distributions (by Year) of Stock Ownership for Shareholders who 
Possess both EIC and BoE Stock, 1719-21 
             
1719 
EIC Stock owned  £0<x<£300  £300≤x<£600  £600≤x<£2000  £2000≤x<£3000  £3000≤x   
             
BoE Stock owned            Row Sum 
£0<x<£300  1.2%  3.3%  2.7%  0.4%  0.6%  8.2% 
£300≤x<£600  2.4%  6.5%  8.7%  2.7%  2.6%  23.0% 
£600≤x<£2000  1.6%  6.4%  16.6%  5.3%  9.6%  39.5% 
£2000≤x<£3000  0.1%  1.7%  2.0%  0.8%  3.6%  8.2% 
£3000≤x  0.5%  0.9%  4.3%  2.6%  12.6%  21.0% 
Column Sum  5.9%  18.9%  34.4%  11.8%  29.0%   
             
Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.659687 
             
1720 
EIC Stock owned  £0<x<£300  £300≤x<£600  £600≤x<£2000  £2000≤x<£3000  £3000≤x   
             
BoE Stock owned            Row Sum 
£0<x<£300  0.8%  3.5%  2.8%  0.9%  1.3%  9.3% 
£300≤x<£600  1.8%  5.9%  8.6%  2.8%  3.2%  22.3% 
£600≤x<£2000  1.8%  4.5%  15.5%  4.7%  10.5%  37.0% 
£2000≤x<£3000  0.4%  1.3%  1.8%  0.7%  3.9%  8.1% 
£3000≤x  0.6%  0.8%  3.9%  2.5%  15.4%  23.2% 
Column Sum  5.3%  16.1%  32.6%  11.6%  34.3%   
             
Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.633171 
             
1721 
EIC Stock owned  £0<x<£300  £300≤x<£600  £600≤x<£2000  £2000≤x<£3000  £3000≤x   
             
BoE Stock owned            Row Sum 
£0<x<£300  3.2%  3.8%  3.2%  0.8%  0.8%  11.9% 
£300≤x<£600  2.5%  7.4%  10.5%  2.4%  3.1%  25.9% 
£600≤x<£2000  2.2%  5.3%  15.7%  4.4%  8.5%  36.2% 
£2000≤x<£3000  0.0%  0.9%  2.1%  1.0%  3.3%  7.2% 
£3000≤x  0.6%  1.1%  4.4%  1.5%  11.1%  18.8% 
Column Sum  8.5%  18.6%  35.9%  10.1%  26.9%   
             
Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.718236 
Notes: The table is organised into three panels for each of the three years for which we have inventory 
data for the EIC and BoE in common. The population in each distribution is the shareholding-account pairs 
(on each day) that each possess positive quantities of both EIC and BoE stock. The resulting numbers in 
each population are quite large. More than 55,000 pairs in 1719 and more than 60,000 pairs in the years 
1720-21. As in Figs. 7 and 8, x represents the amount of stock possessed in an account. The correlation 
coefficients are the Pearson correlations for the pairs (xEIC,xBoE). Because of the very large numbers of 
pairs, the correlations are, of course, highly statistically significant.   30 
6. The demise of the goldsmith bankers and brokers 
The timing of the South Sea credit crisis relative to the rise and fall of share prices is 
hard to pin down. There are no organised sources of information on the supply of 
liquidity or the provision of liquidity services as we would expect in modern financial 
markets. Equivalents to loans on margin or interest on such loans, bid-ask spreads and 
other measures of the costs of trading simply do not exist in South Sea-era sources. To 
be sure, we have general exchange-based information such as the values of assets, 
interest rates and exchange rates, but none of them can be specifically tied to the costs 
of providing liquidity or credit or tied to the demand for liquidity and credit. In this 
paper, however, we can at least begin to describe the collective actions of people who 
were most likely responsible for providing liquidity to the markets and from these 
actions perhaps deduce what was happening in the markets for liquidity. Reputed to 
be at the centre of that financial community were the goldsmith bankers and a group 
of professional brokers, hereafter referred to as the GSBs. This section is devoted to 
an examination of the collective experience of this group. The Bubble literature is 
replete with accounts of selected individuals from this group. First and foremost is the 
notorious collapse of the Swordblade Bank partnership, the South Sea Company‟s 
own bankers, which was a partnership of three of the Company‟s directors.
15 Some 
prominent bankers were clearly exposed to unique risks because they catered to large 
clients. Neal (1994) shows how George Middleton‟s association with Lord 
Londonderry contributed to that banker‟s temporary, but prolonged troubles, that 
began in 1720. Dickson (1967) relates also how a prominent Dutch bank fell because 
it was overly vulnerable to the losses incurred by Sir Justus Beck in 1720. Temin and 
                                                 
15 Dickson (Chapter 7, 1967) recounts the final fall of the 
partnership at the end of September 1720. Shea (2009) recounts the 
legal difficulties of one of the partners in the post-Bubble period.    31 
Voth (2004) present evidence that the partners of Hoarse‟s Bank successfully 
undertook a decided strategy of riding the Bubble, and of not attacking it or trying to 
insulate themselves from it. But until now we have had no description of the 
collective activities of this group. 
We have been able to identify 240 stock account holders who can be positively 
classified either as goldsmith bankers or professional stock brokers. Aside from the 
most famous names, many of these persons identify themselves as such in our EIC 
sources. We have managed to identify many others from BoE sources, sources related 
to the Royal African Company and with some help from other sources.
16 Within this 
group two important goldsmith banker partnerships require remark: the aforesaid 
Swordblade Bank and Child & Co. In the EIC ledgers the three Swordblade partners 
(Jacob Sawbridge, Elias Turner and Sir George Caswall) each have separate accounts 
and there is also a small and dormant account in the name of the Swordblade 
partnership itself. Turner appears to occupy a position in the EIC accounts analogous 
to the position occupied by Sir George Caswall in the BoE accounts. There is every 
appearance that the Swordblade partners were respectively specialised in trade with 
Caswall being the BoE specialist and Turner being the specialist in EIC share trading. 
The Child & Company partnership was represented by substantial EIC accounts for 
each of the six partners who were living in our period.
17 Francis Child and Sir Robert 
are special since they also rotate into and out of Directorship for the EIC itself. At any 
time the holdings of these two banking partnerships together would account for about 
1/3 of all goldsmith bank holdings of East India stock. The Swordblade‟s holdings 
                                                 
16 Professional descriptions variously appear in transfer ledgers and 
stock ledgers for the BoE and the Royal African Company. These 
sources are discussed in Appendix A. Until recently Price’s (1876) 
list of London bankers was the most comprehensive, but it is now 
quite eclipsed by the list compiled by the professional banknote 
dealer, Roger Outing. http://www.banknotes4u.co.uk/english_banks.htm. 
17 These were Francis Child, Sir Robert Child, John Morse, Henry 
Rogers, Samuel Child and Henry Morse.   32 
were smaller and more volatile than were the Child & Co. holdings. Child & Co. 
survived the Bubble and their holdings of EIC, as well as of BoE stock, were 
substantial and steady throughout the crisis. 
What can be immediately affirmed in Figs. 9 and 10 is that prior to the South 
Sea Bubble, markets in both EIC and BoE shares were highly intermediated and that 
GSBs were the intermediaries involved in at least 50 percent and as much as 75 
percent of all transactions in the case of EIC stock. One could never assert that GSBs 
were totally eliminated as intermediaries thereafter, but their dominance was certainly 
eliminated by the end of 1720. The GSB retreat from the markets was markedly faster 
from the EIC share markets than it was from the BoE markets. There was also a 
marked decline in inter-GSB trade. By 1721 they were involved in trade in both 
stocks to the amount of little more than 25 percent of all sales.In terms of 
intermediation (CPT), they were detectable to a small degree only in the BoE share 
markets. 
Figs. 9 and 10 also illustrate the inventories that were in the possession of GSBs 
were very substantial inventories. Even though they were substantial, it is obvious in 
comparing the upper to the lower panels of the figures that they were quite small 
relative to their intermediation activities; GSBs acted primarily as brokers. GSB 
inventories as a percentage of core pass through (CPT) in EIC trade was persistently 
far below average throughout 1719-21. It was far below average in BoE trade in 1719 
and the first half of 1720 until GSBs started to accumulate BoE stock inventories in 
earnest (Figs. 9, 10 and 11, Shea, 2011). 
As far as South Sea Company shares are concerned, we can never know how 
much trade and how large were the inventories collectively commanded by GSBs. It 
could well be argued that GSBs might have shifted significantly towards holding   33 
South Sea Company liabilities in early 1720 and these activities dwarfed their actions 
in the markets for EIC and BoE shares. But even if we assume that EIC and BoE 
share trade was only peripheral to the trade in South Sea Company shares, the 
behaviour of GSBs in these markets still require explanation and can perhaps shed 
some light on what was happening in other markets. 
To summarise what we know so far: 1) GSBs began to withdraw their 
intermediation services from the markets for EIC and BoE shares well before the peak 
in the Bubble. This can be observed in terms of either transactions (Figs. 9 and 10) or 
in terms of their dominance in core pass-through (Fig. 16); 2) At the same time that 
GSBs were selling their inventories of EIC stock, they tended to accumulate 
inventories of BoE stock. In one interpretation, both the withdrawal of intermediation 
services in EIC and BoE markets and the shift in inventories away from the relatively 
risky EIC shares towards BoE shares would be consistent with a view that GSBs were 
in the midst of credit crisis even before the South Sea scheme was fully underway. 
This is possible although it goes against the usual interpretation of events in this 
period. We have good secondary evidence that as early as March and April of 1720 
interest for short-term credit was high.
18 This could have been as indicative of high 
demand for credit as well as it could have indicated a shortage in the supply of it. 
Dickson (1967) and Neal (1990) have both re-iterated accounts by earlier sources of 
how with the collapse in asset values in France in early 1720, as John Law‟s System 
fell apart, capital came from the continent to London to create high demand for credit. 
But intermediaries in England too might have suffered from the collapse of asset 
values in France. If their net asset values were adversely affected by the collapse of 
the Law system, that may have reduced their willingness to supply liquidity services 
                                                 
18 10 p.c. per month was claimed as the cost of credit by George 
Middleton (Neal, 1994) and Hutcheson (1720) stated such were the 
terms for credit in March and April of 1720.   34 
in London and that too would have been consistent with both higher costs of credit 
and in a movement from risky assets (EIC stock) to less risky assets (BoE stock) – as 
if they were engaged in a “flight to quality”. 
The GSB withdrawal from market intermediation was not only collective, but 
was also experienced at the very pinnacle of the GSB community. Intermediated stock 
flows (taking CPT as a proxy for such flows) were distributed in a highly skewed 
fashion across financial intermediaries. For example, in the spring of 1720, PT and 
CPT were approximately 60 percent of total stock sales, but more than 10 percent of 
total sales generally flowed through the hands of each of only the top one or two CPT 
traders (Fig. 3, Shea, 2011). These top traders in CPT were also noticed in the 
analyses done by Carols, Neal and Wandschneider (2007). The top traders were 
invariably the Swordblade Bank partners Elias Turner for EIC trading and Sir George 
Caswall for BoE stock trading prior to and during the Bubble. Their dominance, 
however, vanished by autumn 1720 along with many other GSBs who, while not 
nearly as important as the Swordblade partners, nevertheless tended to be amongst the 
top ten or so CPT traders. A perusal of the lists of these top traders in Appendix B and 
Appendix C shows how the GSBs were displaced from the highest ranks of trading 
intermediaries. 
How GSBs traded changed remarkably too as the Bubble progressed. Even 
though GSBs were able to behave like brokering intermediaries throughout the 
Bubble (Figs. 10 and 11, Shea, 2011), the persons with whom they dealt, when 
classified with regard to the size of their stock inventories, changed radically. Before 
the Bubble GSBs amassed their inventories by buying from relatively small holders of 
stock (Fig. 8, Shea, 2011). Within the middle six months of 1720, at the height of the 
Bubble and as they disgorged their large inventories, they sold to persons whose   35 
inventories of stock were every bit as large as theirs. The recipients of these sales 
tended to be already substantial EIC shareholders who were about to take over the 
GSB role as market intermediaries (Section 9), foreign and British-resident merchants, 
who were also largely Jewish. By 1721, as their intermediation continued to diminish, 
GSBs tended to purchase shares from persons whose inventories were larger than 
theirs.  
In several ways therefore the division of our network data into GSB and 
nonGSB partitions is the most suggestive of further lines of research. GSBs were the 
pre-eminent intermediaries of the pre-Bubble period in EIC and BoE stock. Did GSBs 
withdraw from stock trading during the Bubble to serve as intermediaries in the 
markets for South Sea shares, or were they retreating from the markets as a whole 
because they were themselves being subjected to the rigours of a liquidity crisis? 
These are questions to which we shall return in future research.   36 
 
 
Fig. 9. Goldsmith Banker & Broker (GSB) Trade and Inventories of EIC Stock 
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NonGSB-mediated transfers  38 
7. Company directors: temporary intermediates in the crisis 
 
It is not easy to define network partitions that can be completely separated from other 
partitions. There will often be some overlap between any two groups of people, but 
there do exist other groups of individuals who were significant in trade and 
inventories and who also were largely not GSBs. The directors of the two companies 
were two such groups. The BoE Directors‟ actions have been examined before (ch. 5, 
Neal, 1990) and to go along with some of that analysis we present the contrasting 
actions of the EIC Directors. At any time in our period there were 24 persons elected 
to be directors of the EIC. The Court of Directors was elected in each year and took 
up their positions in their first meeting of the Court in April of each year. We have 
collected the names of five separate Courts in each of the successive years 1719 
through 1723. From one Court to the next there was much less than a complete 
turnover in serving members so that in the five years the 24 names who appear in each 
year are from a list of only about 47 names.
19 The Directors were largely merchant 
types with no extensive overlap with identifiable GSBs, with the only significant 
exception of the overlap with the Child & Company partnership discussed in the 
previous section. In the analysis to follow we have excluded the Childs from the 
group of EIC Directors. We shall also include in this group some other prominent 
Company servants, a few of whom appear in the group as Directors in any case.  
These are the maritime captains who most frequently provided and commanded ships 
in the service of the Company (Hardy, 1800). When put together with the group of 
                                                 
19 The names of Directors formally appear in the Minutes of the Courts 
of Directors, IOR B/255. No Director could serve more than four 
continuous terms as a Director and would have to possess £2000 
nominal stock to qualify for election. See Chaudhuri (p. 132, 1978) 
and election by-laws contained in East India Company, A list of the 
names of the members of the United-Company of Merchants of England, 
Trading to the East-Indies, the 28th of March, 1721.   39 
individuals who served as Directors, we have a list of 116 individuals that we can call 
the EIC Director and company servants group. 
Now let us refer to what can be supported by the evidence in Fig. 11. As a group 
EIC Directors would have to own, at a minimum, 1.5 percent of total stock 
outstanding.
20 In our period, however, it appears that Directors generally never owned 
less than 5 percent of the Company‟s equity. The Directors too did not trade much 
with each other and did not appear to trade much with the public except during the 
crisis of 1720. There is some evidence that at the height of the Bubble, they did act as 
intermediaries in EIC stock trade (Fig. 16). This is the only period in which Director-
mediated trade was as high as 20 percent of total trade. And although we can never 
know the value terms at which such trades took place, their timing appeared to be far 
from propitious for the Directors; their net purchases of shares was greatest when 
share values were high and they disgorged much of their holdings only after share 
values had largely collapsed. Only very briefly in September 1720 did they own as 
much as 10 percent of firm equity. 
There is thus every appearance that Directors attempted to act as intermediaries 
in EIC share trade during the Bubble, but did little before or after the Bubble to 
continue to facilitate trade in shares. Other companies such as the BoE, the South Sea 
Company and the Royal African Company hoped to support the markets in their 
shares by providing loans to shareholders upon the security of their shares. The 
popular theory was that if shares were pledged as collateral for loans, pledged shares 
would be removed from the net supply of shares and the provided loans would 
increase the demand for shares and, hence, market values of shares would be 
enhanced. We have found no evidence that the EIC Directors even considered such a 
                                                 
20 24 Directors times the minimum qualification per Director (£2000) 
would be £48,000, or 1.5 percent of the approximate £3.2 million 
stock issued and outstanding.   40 
policy; it appeared instead that Directors understood that their own personal wealth 
would have to be used to support trade in EIC shares. This evidence compares 
interestingly with Fig. 5.5 presented by Neal (1990). The pattern of the rise and fall of 
stock ownership for BoE directors found in that figure mimics very closely what is 
found in the bottom half of Fig. 12. Neal (1990) attributes these actions to the desire 
by BoE directors to be accommodating to the South Sea Company‟s planned debt-
equity swaps by means of injecting liquidity into the markets through open-market 
purchases of BoE shares. It is difficult to attribute the same motives to the EIC 
directors and thus we think it is more likely that both sets of directors merely felt that 
their personal actions supported their own companies‟ equity market trade and values, 
else we would observe directors purchasing across a spectrum of shares instead of just 
their own firm‟s shares. In Fig. 16 it appears that BoE Directors were less willing than 
were EIC Directors to act as intermediaries in their own Company‟s stock. We also 
observe (Figs. 11 and 12) that, in the longer term, directors reduced their holdings of 
shares in the opposite firm and increased their holdings in their own firm‟s shares. In 
summary, the importance of company directors as holders of stock and as 
intermediaries was brief and spanned only the summer and early autumn months of 
1720.  41 
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8. Foreign ownership and trade in shares 
It is now widely known that the earliest European financial centres were built upon 
foundations of international commerce. Wherever was located a port through which a 
certain scale of international trade flowed, there was the likely spot that institutions 
that facilitated payments and investments would grow. In the early modern period and 
up to the events of 1720, London and Amsterdam had far outstripped other European 
port cities in these regards. To such a scale did trade and financial institutions develop 
that Carlos and Neal (2011) argue that London and Amsterdam could follow and did 
follow different specialisations in finance, the former developing a market-orientated 
system and the latter developing a more bank-based system. With two different, but 
complementary, systems developing on either side of the North Sea, payment systems 
for the settlement of imbalances in trade accounts naturally developed along with 
foreign merchants‟ interest in holding British investments. Neal (ch. 5, 1990) has 
argued that the interest of foreigners in British investments in 1720 was especially 
enlivened for several reasons. First, the supply of investable funds flowed towards 
Britain naturally as continental asset values collapsed in late 1719 and in early 1720. 
Secondly, the timing of Dutch interest in BoE stocks after the collapse of the Bubble 
might have been piqued by the speculated role the Bank would play in the settlement 
of the crisis. In this section we can present additional data on foreign, especially 
Dutch, participation in the South Sea Bubble. We shall see that the foreign investment 
and intermediation in 1720 were different in the two stock markets that we examine. 
Although some foreigners were prominent bankers and had operations in 
London, in the main they had no overlap with either of the two groups we have 
considered so far – the GSBs and company directors. In our database we can identify 
691 foreign accounts who were owned majorly by 553 Dutch investors. There were   44 
another 26 individuals besides who resided in what would now be called Belgium. 
Along with these groups we have identified 67 Swiss, 26 Germans, 10 French, 6 
Italians and 3 Portuguese owners of stock. It will be of little surprise to historians that 
we can affirm that Dutch ownership and trade in shares was several orders of 
magnitude larger than ownership and trade commanded by all other foreign nationals 
combined (Figs. 13 and 15). 
Dutch ownership in the EIC was proportionally larger than it was in the BoE. 
Dutch interest in EIC investment started before the South Sea Bubble and Dutch 
buying was sustained into the rising market for EIC shares and also after prices in that 
market started to collapse. Dutch interest in EIC investment indeed seemed to be 
invariant to what was happening to EIC share prices or to what was happening to 
exchange rates (Figs. 13 and 14). The literature that treats with the issues of capital 
flight from the continent towards London interprets the broad trends in exchange rates 
in Fig. 14 in that light. The flight of capital was supposed to have fuelled the South 
Sea Bubble at the end of 1719 and in early 1720 and may have been a response to the 
collapse of the Law System in France. The later outward flows supposedly took place 
in the wake of the South Sea Bubble as foreigners sold British assets to meet their 
more stringent credit needs abroad (Neal, 1990). Capital-flow trends in the large 
would of course not necessarily be reflected in observable trends in British equity 
capital ownership. Equity capital would have been just one type of British capital 
assets that foreigners could have invested in. But in being one of the most fungible 
(many such assets being tradable abroad, as well as in London), we might expect that 
foreign investment was especially concentrated in British public corporate liabilities. 
In terms of BoE share ownership, Carlos and Neal argue that if there was a relative 
shift towards foreign ownership and away from domestic ownership in shares, it took   45 
place after the South Sea Bubble.
21 The earlier foreign investment in the EIC during 
the Bubble is a contrast to such investment in the BoE. 
As was the case for the BoE, there was a substantial increase in the foreign 
ownership in the EIC. We find, however, the increase was the product of an increase 
in Dutch ownership of shares throughout the South Sea Bubble period and not 
afterwards. This is in stark contrast to Fig. 15 and to Fig. 5.6 in Neal (1990), which 
show that the largest increases in holdings of BoE stocks occurred after September 
1720 and not before. As we have mentioned already, Neal attributes this to especially 
large block purchases by Dutch investors who were especially interested in 
influencing the Bank‟s decisions with regard to the large-scale financial restructuring 
plan for the South Sea Company and the Bank that was being proposed by elements in 
Parliament and in the two companies. The modest increases in NonDutch foreign 
holdings distinctly followed after the crisis. The Dutch were different and the fact that 
they rapidly increased their holdings of EIC stock throughout 1720 stands in stark 
contrast to the history that links the credit crisis with large outflows of foreign capital 
from London in the latter half of 1720. Of course, it is always possible that EIC equity 
investment was especially attractive to foreigners at this time relative to other British 
investment opportunities so that, even in a period of general capital flight abroad, 
there would still be an increasing net foreign demand for EIC shares. In this regard 
there is the evidence (Fig. 16) that foreigners largely replaced GSBs in the provision 
of intermediation services in the markets for EIC shares. They may have gathered 
larger inventories in their efforts to provide these services. 
In Fig. 14 we illustrate the 6-month moving average of the percentage rates of 
increase/decrease in foreign ownership of shares and compare those to the broad 6-
                                                 
21 Carlos and Neal (p. 524, 2006).   46 
month rates of depreciation in exchange rates between London and Amsterdam. This 
serves to illustrate the respective differences in timing in foreign accumulations of 
shares and how they relate to the two separate exchange-rate episodes of 1720. Of 
course we cannot reconstruct causality without the aid of a model that simultaneously 
explains domestic/foreign net demands for stocks and exchange, but at least we have 
shown here that foreign demand for shares, overwhelmingly dominated by that of the 
Dutch, may have prompted strong exchange rate appreciation and, at the very least, 
was not attenuated by rapidly appreciating sterling in the middle third of 1720. We 
have also parenthetically demonstrated that NonDutch continental demand for EIC 
shares may well have been responding to different factors than those which were 
important to the Dutch. 
Foreign demand for the two stocks may have arisen from distinctly different 
groups of foreigners even though they might have shared the same Dutch nationality. 
In the case of EIC stocks, the foreign interest came from a merchant class that showed 
that it was also interested in carrying on an intermediate trading role – taking over to a 
large extent from the GSBs. The post-Bubble surge in foreign demand for BoE stocks, 
in contrast, resulted in no intermediation in BoE stock trade. We leave for later study 
an  attempt  to  more  finely  discriminate  amongst  Dutch  investors  and  why  they 
appeared to have behaved so differently in the two separate markets for shares. 
What we have seen so far are three data partitions that are as interesting in the 
behaviour in financial intermediation contained within them as they are distinct as 
divisions along social or professional lines. The placement of persons on a social 
network clearly connects intimately with economic behaviours during the South Sea 
Bubble and in the next section we shall see this again when we consider the role of 
the Jewish merchant community.   47 
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Fig. 14.  Six-Month Percentage Rates of Accumulation of Foreign-Owned EIC Stock 
and Foreign Exchange Depreciations in London. 
N.B. The exchange rate used in the lower panel is the twice-weekly-reported 2-month 
schellingen banco/pound exchange rate in London described and analysed by Neal (pp. 64-
80 and 104-17, 1990). 
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Fig. 15. Foreign Trade and Inventories in Bank of England Stock   50 
9. Market intermediation and the Jewish merchant community 
The Jewish merchant community was prominent in the commercial life of London in 
the early 18
th century and played a role in the markets of 1720. It included both 
British and nonBritish domiciled merchants, so many of the foreigners, Dutch in 
particular, with whom we treated in the previous section would have been Jewish. But 
the Jewish community that resided in Britain was also prominent in financial circles 
and shall be treated here as the basis for another network partition. Carlos, Maguire 
and Neal (2008) apply some notions of network connections and distance within a 
network to try to place the Jewish community within BoE market networks of the 
period. We undertake here a network approach as well, but one based upon the 
devisings we described in Section 3 of this paper. This is appropriate because we wish 
to close this paper with the argument that the Jewish merchant community, both 
domestic and foreign, stepped in and replaced the GSBs as major intermediaries for 
market trade after the South Sea Bubble. The position of a few Jews with respect to 
the declining position of Sir George Caswall that is discussed by Carlos, Maguire and 
Neal may well have epitomised a shift between the whole class of GSBs and the 
Jewish merchant community in the stock markets. 
In Section 3 we argued that the flow of pass through (PT) relative to total sales 
was a natural way to measure intermediation in a network. Secondly, we stated that 
well-connected PT, or core pass-through (CPT), relative to PT was also a natural way 
of measuring the density of intermediation. By both measures trade in shares was 
increasingly dis-intermediated in the wake of the South Sea Bubble. PT amounts to at 
least 50 p.c. of sales. The percentage it is higher for EIC trade than it is for BoE trade, 
but for both companies it undergoes a steady decline after 1720 (top panel, Fig. 16). 
Although in Fig. 3 node-degree centrality seemed to increase after the Bubble, this   51 
conveyed a misleading impression that the market in shares was somehow becoming 
re-integrated. Trade was not restored as flows between well-connected intermediaries; 
Fig. 3 only showed that sellers simply tended to sell to greater numbers of individuals 
and, similarly, buyers tended to buy from a larger number of sellers than before. 
Neither were these new buyers nor sellers more likely to deal with intermediaries, nor 
were they more likely to become intermediaries than they were before the South Sea 
Bubble. 
In the case of EIC trade, PT was almost always entirely CPT, whereas for BoE 
trade it was only occasionally that the majority of PT was CPT (second panel, Fig. 16). 
Densely intermediated trade declined for both stocks after the Bubble, but the decline 
was precipitous and absolutely larger for BoE trade than it was for EIC trade. Within 
CPT we can see the fleeting roles played in trade by company directors (bottom two 
panels, Fig. 16). We can also see more clearly that the increasing prominence of 
foreign owners of stock was also nuanced between the two types of shares; although 
foreign stock owners were measurably larger parts of share ownerships after the 
Bubble, they were much more likely to be intermediaries in trade of EIC stocks than 
they were for BoE stocks. The Jewish merchant intermediary was always present as 
an owner of EIC stocks and, together with foreigners, took over intermediation from 
GSBs pari passu with the latter‟s decline. In the case of BoE trade, however, the 
Jewish merchant intermediary was a creation of the South Sea Bubble and its 
continued prominence alone after the Bubble could not maintain CPT as a majority 
share in PT.
22 
                                                 
22 Carlos, Maguire and Neal (2008) argue that the Jewish community 
may have filled holes in market and social brokerage. We see evidence 
for that here for both shares, although we could argue that it was 
larger and more pronounced in the markets for EIC shares than it ever 
was in the BoE share markets.   52 
The Jewish merchant community did much to replace the GSBs as financial 
intermediaries after the South Sea Bubble. But these groups could not perfectly 
replace the GSBs so that the scale and density of intermediation could remain what is 
was before the Bubble. Part of the reason might have been that dealership as a form of 
intermediation was not as efficient as would have been brokerage. No group 
surpassed the GSBs as brokers and as important as Jewish and foreign merchants 
became in stock trading, they did so only by holding larger than average inventories 
of stock (Figs. 10 and 11, Shea, 2011). 
These trends are open to opposed interpretations that require further 
investigation. We can think that intermediation declined and became more inventory-
centric after the South Sea Bubble as an indication that markets operated at a lower 
trading efficiency than in the past. On the other hand, low-inventory trade was prior to 
the Bubble dominated by especially large and perhaps overly influential traders, 
particularly the GSBs. It remains unclear whether their demise (and we have not yet 
established if this demise was permanent) as dominant traders was a bad or good thing 
from the perspective of British security market development.   53 
 



















































































































































































































































































Fig. 16.  Intermediation and Composition of Intermediation in terms of 
Pass Through and Core Pass Through.   54 
10. Conclusions and directions for further research 
In this paper we have undertaken a network analysis of the contemporaneous 
ownership and trade in EIC and BoE shares before, during and after the South Sea 
Bubble. The facts surrounding the trade in EIC shares are new. EIC shares were 
traded in larger blocks and more frequently than were BoE shares so that total trading 
turnover of the former company‟s stocks was about 50 percent higher than it was for 
shares in the latter company. EIC shares were riskier than were BoE shares and the 
benefits in terms of risk reduction in owning both shares were substantial. Not 
surprisingly, there was substantial cross-holding of shares of the two firms. BoE 
shareholders were marginally more likely to also be EIC shareholders than it was 
likely that EIC shareholders would also be BoE shareholders. We also found that 
owners of large amounts of stock were more likely to be owners of shares in both 
firms. The ownership of the two firms was always quite diffuse, but it became slightly 
more so after 1720. 
In analyses of the trade and ownership of shares in a network structure we 
have found that separate analyses of partitions along social and professional lines 
were helpful. There were four distinct network partitions investigated. The partitions 
were respectively based upon: i) a collection of goldsmith bankers & brokers (the 
GSBs); ii) company directors; iii) foreign owners of shares and iv) British-resident 
Jews. There was a very heavy representation of merchants in the latter two groups. 
Before the South Sea Bubble, more than 70 percent of trade was going through the 
hands of the GBS group alone. As the Bubble progressed, the trading prominence of 
the goldsmith bankers collapsed, but was replaced by trade going through the hands of 
company directors (only temporarily),  foreigners and Jewish merchants. At the same 
time markets generally became more dis-intermediated, although to begin with the   55 
markets for BoE shares were markedly less subject to intermediation than were the 
markets in EIC shares. We also saw that intermediation tended to pass away from 
brokers and came more into the hands of dealers. The major dealers in stock were the 
Jewish merchant class of London and together with foreigners did much to supply the 
intermediation that was previously in the hands of GSBs, who acted more like brokers. 
At least that is a story that fits the markets for EIC shares. In the markets for BoE 
shares, the Jewish merchant class appeared as intermediaries relatively late in the 
Bubble period and foreigners never played as extensive a role as they played in the 
EIC markets. 
The most interesting historical questions raised by our analyses concern the 
control of trade before and after the South Sea Bubble and the health of markets. For 
example, did the South Sea Bubble damage the secondary markets for shares? After 
the Bubble, intermediation in the markets was not quite as important as it was before 
and intermediation was carried on more by dealers than by brokers. This would not 
necessarily be a bad thing for the development of markets. The actions of GSBs, 
especially in the EIC market, prior to the Bubble are especially interesting and may 
even have been suspicious. GSBs clearly dominated not only trade volumes, but their 
actions dominated trends in inventory accumulation and within their group large 
portions of trade were gathered into the hands of just a few individuals. This GSB 
dominance also clearly disappeared prior to the summer of 1720. So, were they 
efficient purveyors of trading services and did their subsequent demise bring trading 
inefficiencies to the markets that were not there before? Or could it have been the case 
that a rapid accumulation of shares and the dominant role they played in 
intermediation prior to the Bubble allowed GSBs to become overly influential and to 
become a barrier to efficient social learning about the true values of shares? This   56 
could happen in a social learning model such as that presented by Golub and Jackson 
(2010). On that interpretation their demise was perhaps good for the efficiency of 
markets. We suspend judgement on these matters pending some further planned 
studies of the GSBs. 
A priority therefore is to extend EIC and BoE network data to years outside of 
the 1719-21 range. In particular, we wish to confirm whether GSB prominence in the 
share markets substantially pre-dated 1719 and whether it was revived after 1721. 
There is yet another dataset to be added to the network trading database. For trade and 
inventories in the Royal African Company‟s (RAC) subscription shares in 1720 we 
can construct the same data structures that we have employed in this paper. The 
RAC‟s subscription shares were very, very risky securities indeed and on that basis 
alone their trade network will bear interesting comparison to the trade networks of 
EIC and BoE shares. Clearly too an effort is now required in developing behavioural 
models of financial intermediation (with inventories) on a network. Why social and 
professional affiliations would appear to be correlated with the scale of intermediation 
(PT), the density of intermediation (CPT) and the style of intermediation (brokerage 
vs. dealership) remains unclear. In these ways network analysis can supply new 
directions for quantitative research about the South Sea Bubble and might go some 
way towards restoring the “discipline of counting” whose absence Hoppit (2002) 
deplored in the literature of the South Sea Bubble.  57 
Appendix A: Data sources, methods and data structures 
From the 1720‟s there are three types of stock record that we could potentially use to 
study stock ownership: a) stock ledgers; b) transfer books and c) subscription lists. 
The structure and logic of stock ledgers and transfer books, in the instance of 
 the BoE 
records, have been fully discussed.
23 There are no existing transfer books for East 
India stocks, but there do exist complete sets of stock ledgers. Since stock ledgers 
from this era record transfers to and from accounts in a double-entry manner as debits 
and credits, we can re-construct from them the complete trading history of shares. We 
have attributed to all legal persons who appear in such sources unique identification 
(account ID) numbers. The methods we have used to identify individuals and to 
distinguish between them are varied and are described below. With the complete 
trading history of a stock we can also work either forward or backwards from the 
record of stock ownership on a particular date to re-create any individual‟s stock 
inventories for any other particular date. This is simply done by calculating net sales 
of shares by each and every individual through to a particular period and then by 
adding their net sales to their inventory of shares as recorded in a stock ledger. Since 
we can reconstruct all account-holders‟ inventories through time, we can also 
reconstruct the “vintage” of such inventories. An inventory‟s vintage is a weighted 
average of the lengths of time over which stock in the inventory is held. For example 
if £ 500 stock held consisted of £ 300 held for 100 days and £ 200 held for 50 days, the 
average inventory vintage is (£ 300× 100+£ 200× 50)/£ 500 = 80 days. 
                                                 
23 Carlos and Neal (2006), pp. 504-6.   58 
EIC Data 
We use one source for ownership and trade in EIC (EIC) shares, the Stock Ledger F, 
IOR L/AG/14/5/4.
24 This ledger covers the entire South Sea Bubble era. All persons 
credited with stock in this ledger either owned the stock on 25 March 1719 (credited 
from Stock Ledger E, IOR L/AG/14/5/3) or purchased stock after that date. Similarly, 
all persons who owned stock on 25 March 1723 are credited with stock in the next 
ledger in the series (Stock Ledger G, IOR L/AG/14/5/5). From it we could have 
recorded an actual stock balance ledger for either 25 March 1719 or 25 March 1723, 
but because we have recorded only the “debit” side (the side on which sales of shares 
are recorded) of each folio in the ledger, the basic stock balance and distribution that 
we have recorded is for 25 March 1723.
25 We can construct, however, virtual stock 
ledger balances for any date prior to 25 March 1723, as we have discussed above, by 
deducting net sales of shares backward from 25 March 1723. In this way we have 
computed the net stock balances for all accounts that appear in the ledger for 25 
March 1719 and have compared them to the written stock balances that appear in the 
original ledger. Our computed stock balances and the actual stock balances match 
perfectly and so we are particularly confident in the quality of the trading data that we 
have for this company. At the very least we are confident that it perfectly reflects the 
information contained in the original stock ledger. The resulting accuracy with which 
we can trace EIC shareholders‟ ownership through time owes much to the painstaking 
and self-checking nature of the accounting methods used by EIC clerks in this era. 
                                                 
24 India Office Records, British Library. 
25 The original manuscript included 752 pages from which we coded 
nearly 12,000 lines of data.   59 
BoE Data 
Much of the information we have as to the identities and social and economic 
characteristics of our East India shareholders results from the study of a subset of the 
database that informed the study of BoE (BoE) shareholders (Carlos and Neal, 2006). 
This subset of data consisted of transcriptions from the BoE transfer books 
AC27/1539-1558 and encompassed transactions for the years 1719, 1720 and 1721. 
These data were contained in three spreadsheets and related to these was another 
spreadsheet that recorded the balances of BoE shares held by individuals in 1725.
26 In 
this last spreadsheet the holders of stock in 1725 (amounting to in total to £8,953,622 
stock) had a recorded overlap with the set of the individuals who held stock in 1720, 
but the union of these two sets held stock to the amount of only £4 ,089,771, which 
was less than 80 percent of the total amount of stock issued and outstanding in 1720. 
So, we have gone back to the original sources
27 and found additional stock accounts 
and can now account for the total of £5,563,080 of nominal stock that was outstanding 
on 29 September 1720. With reliable balances for individual accounts we could then 
use the transactions data to calculate net sales from accounts and to produce virtual 
stock ledgers in precisely the same manner as we did for our East India data. In the 
process of doing this we also discovered in the stock ledgers a good number of 
transactions (nearly 100) that either are not to be found or were missed in the BoE 
transfers books. On 29 September 1720 there were 2961 accounts in the ledgers 
holding the £5,563,080 stock outstanding. Many of these, however, were trust 
accounts. In particular, there was a very large trust account in the names of several 
Bank Directors that held all the stock that was pledged as security on loans the Bank 
                                                 
26 Our thanks to Larry Neal who provided these spreadsheets. 
27 This was based upon data extracted from BoE stock ledgers and 
their indexes, AC27/430-437 and the additional stock ledgers, 
AC27/6439-6450.   60 
was making to shareholders at the time. On 29 September this account alone held 
£ 1,024,150 on behalf of 270 other accounts. So altogether on 29 September 1720 
there were 3,231 accounts in ownership of stock. A number of these accounts were 
under joint-ownership, so that 3,230 accounts contain stock owned altogether by 
3,375 individuals. Among the 3,230 accounts there also were a handful of institutional 
accounts, but we have treated each institution as one person in our count of 3,375 
individuals.
28 
Every stock account in our databases has a unique ID number regardless 
whether the owner is a unique individual or a multi-person entity, such as in the case 
of a joint account or in the case of an institutional investor. One problem in assigning 
reliable ID numbers to individuals is to distinguish amongst individuals who have 
names in common. Any very common surname was very likely to be linked with 
common forenames for a goodly number of different individuals.
29 There are also 
people who have multiple identifications. We have, for example, accounts for widows 
and spinsters in one name and accounts for the same persons elsewhere in the ledgers 
labelled with their later married names. We have some prominent shareholders who 
held BoE accounts in one name and then later have other accounts labelled with their 
titles. As explained elsewhere, the BoE transfer books and stock ledgers link the 
names of buyers and sellers of stock to accounts that appear on various folio pages in 
the stock ledgers. The careful sorting and re-sorting of the spreadsheets by names and 
ledger folio numbers gave us a start in assigning unique ID numbers to individuals. 
Related to this information is all the occupation and address information that was 
                                                 
28 Carlos and Neal (2006) report that on 29 September 1720 they can 
account for 3,163 BoE shareholders. 
29 The surname would not necessarily even have to be particularly 
common to present difficulties. Difficulties could arise in 
distinguishing between members of families with common forenames. We 
have for example three closely related Benjamin Dry’s who have 
accounts in EIC stock.   61 
recorded in either the stock ledgers and their indexes or the additional stock ledgers, 
AC27/6439-6450. Because of the socio-economic information about investors that are 
contained in the BoE sources, considerable synergies in identifying people were 
achieved when we started to link the BoE data with that for investors in EIC shares. 
Even further synergies in identifying people have been achieved as we merge 
our EIC database and the BoE database with similar databases for owners of Royal 
African Company (RAC) stock and subscription shares. These too have spreadsheet 
form now and encompass a description of RAC share ownership at the end of 1719 
(T70/197), a highly fragmentary record of trade in RAC shares in 1720 (T70/198), 
and a complete set of transfer books for RAC subscription shares for 1720 and 1721 
(T70/199-202). We do not study these RAC sources in this paper, but leave their 
study for a future paper. 
 
Network Graph Data Structure 
The structure of our data describes a dynamic, multiple directed edge network graph, 
or what would be commonly called a dynamic multidigraph.  The nodes or vertices of 
the graph are the ID numbers of individuals and account holders whom we have 
already identified directly from the BoE and EIC sources discussed above or from 
other sources. The graph is a directed graph because each node can be identified as 
either a seller or a buyer of stock and we define an edge which connects two nodes as 
a directed edge from seller to buyer. The resulting edge has a numeric weight 
associated with the nominal size of the trade. 
The trade weight of every edge is a time-dependent attribute of that edge. As a 
general rule we associate time-dependent characteristics of trade and traders with 
edge attributes only. Edge attributes therefore include not only trade-weights, but also   62 
include the date of the trade, the type of stock traded (EIC or BoE), the stock 
inventories of the seller and buyer and the average vintages of the stock inventories of 
the seller and buyers.  Even non-trading activity can be recorded within this data-
structure; we employ the device of self-edges or selfloops, as they are more 
commonly called, to refer to trade (with oneself) in which the edge weight is recorded 
as zero. Thus a person who holds stock, but does not trade on a particular day, will be 
assigned a zero-weighted selfloop for that day. Even persons who have not yet entered 
or who never do enter into active stock ownership and trade can be recorded as 
isolated nodes in this graph; they are simply assigned zero-weighted selfloops with 
zero-inventory and zero-inventory-vintage attributes. 
Attributes of trade and traders, especially social affiliations, which are distinctly 
less time-dependent are associated with the nodes. Node attributes are recorded only 
as binary variables. Obvious examples of such attributes are gender and social and 
economic characteristics of persons, such as those that were prominently featured in 
analyses of BoE shareholders (Carlos and Neal, 2006). Just as edge attributes are 
mutable or time-dependent attributes, best measured on a continuous line, node 
attributes are immutable and are best measured as binary 0s and 1s. Although 
nowadays gender can be thought of as mutable, we treat early 18
th-century gender as 
an immutable attribute. Social and economic classifications of individuals can of 
course change and are not, strictly speaking, immutable, but we treat them as so. So, 
for example, an individual may not be a Member of Parliament at all times, but that 
does not prevent us from treating him as a member of a parliamentary class at all 
times. Indeed, in this instance, the list of all members of all the Parliaments 
immediately before, during and after the South Sea Bubble is precisely how we define   63 
the parliamentary class.
30 This list of members is also part of our graph‟s node list, so 
our graph does indeed include individuals who never trade and never own stock. 
Social and economic characteristics can also be multiple and we record them as such. 
Thus a person may be of the merchant class, the parliamentary class, a BoE director 
or the captain of an EIC ship
31 and may also be a knight. The list of all possible node 
attributes is possibly infinite in length, but in the current version of the database the 
length is limited to those attributes that we can confidently make binary assignments 
for all node IDs. 
                                                 
30 The list was compiled from Sedgwick’s, House of Commons, 1715-1754, 
Volumes 1 and 2. We are currently expanding the enumeration of the 
parliamentary class by adding lists of sitting House of Lords members 
to the database. 
31 A company director must hold (but not necessarily) trade stock in 
his own company, but an EIC captain would not necessarily be an EIC 
stock holder and trader, although he sometimes was. The company 
director class was compiled from the periodic lists of newly elected 
directors that appear in the minute books of the EIC and the BoE. The 
EIC captains’ list is compiled from lists found in Hardy (1800).   64 
Appendix B: The top traders in East India Company stock CPT, 1719-21 
29/6/1719  29/7/1719  28/8/1719  26/9/1719  17/10/1719  16/11/1719 
           
Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner * 
Jacob Sawbridge *  Moses Hart *  John Mead *  John Mead *  John Mead *  James Colebrook * 
John Mead *  Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin *  Duke of Buckingham  James Martin *  Thomas Martin * 
Moses Hart *  John Mead *  Duke of Buckingham  Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin *  James Martin * 
Thomas Martin *  Moses Da Medina  Moses Hart *  James Martin *  Duke of Buckingham  George Middleton * 
Samuel Lesingham *  George Middleton *  George Middleton *  George Middleton *  James Colebrook *  John Emmet * 
Moses Da Medina  Johanna Cock *  Johanna Cock *  John Emmet *  John Emmet *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes 
Duke of Buckingham  Samuel Perry  John Emmet *  Jacob Mendes Da Costa  George Middleton *  Edward Coull * 
Abraham Edlin *  John Marke *  John Marke *  James Colebrook *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes  John Mead * 
Isaac Fernandes Nunes  George Wanley *  Samuel Perry  Rt Hon Bridget Fauconberg  Jacob Mendes Da Costa  George Wanley * 
George Middleton *           
 
N.B. The lists show in rank order the top traders in EIC stock who facilitated core pass-through (CPT) in the quarter ending on the dates shown at the top of 
each list. Ranks 1 through 10 are listed, with more than 10 persons listed whenever one or more than one individual shares a rank with another. „*‟ denotes a 
member of the GSB-class. 
 
Continued on next page. 
16/12/1719  25/1/1720  24/2/1720  18/3/1720  22/4/1720  24/5/1720 
           
Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner * 
Samuel Strode *  Samuel Strode *  Samuel Strode *  Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin * 
Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin *  George Middleton *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes  Moses Da Medina 
James Colebrook *  George Middleton *  John Mead *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes  Moses Da Medina  Isaac Franks 
Moses Hart *  James Colebrook *  George Middleton *  Moses Da Medina  George Wanley *  James Buck 
George Middleton *  Moses Hart *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes  Nathanael Brassey *  Robert Jacomb *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes 
John Mead *  Abraham Edlin *  Moses Hart *  John Mead *  Nathanael Brassey *  Samuel Strode * 
Abraham Edlin *  John Mead *  Robert Jacomb *  Robert Jacomb *  George Middleton *  Gabriel Lopes 
John Emmet *  Duke of Buckingham  Moses Da Medina  Edward Owen  John Mead *  James Martin * 
Edward Coull *  Isaac Fernandes Nunes  Duke of Buckingham  Gabriel Lopes  Gabriel Lopes  Sir Justus Beck 
             65 
 
23/6/1720  23/7/1720  22/8/1720  20/9/1720  21/10/1720  19/11/1720 
           
Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Elias Turner *  Lord Londonderry  Mathew Decker  Mathew Decker 
Thomas Martin *  Thomas Martin *  Isaac Franks  Richard Lockwood  Lord Londonderry  Richard Lockwood 
Isaac Franks  Isaac Franks  Thomas Martin *  George Middleton *  Richard Lockwood  Joseph Musaphia 
Moses Hart *  Moses Hart *  Moses Hart *  Mathew Decker  Joseph Musaphia  Lord Londonderry 
James Buck  James Buck  Conelius  Backer  Joseph Musaphia  Conelius  Backer  James Martin * 
Moses Da Medina  Conelius  Backer  George Middleton *  Elias Turner *  George Middleton *  Conelius  Backer 
John Broun  Moses Da Medina  Richard Hill  Conelius  Backer  Salamon de Moseh Pereira  Francis Pereira 
Conelius  Backer  John Broun  Daniel Nathans  Salamon de Moseh Pereira  John Knight *  Salamon de Moseh Pereira 
Mathew Decker  Mathew Decker  Mathew Decker  Edward Harrison  Francis Pereira  Edward Harrison 
Gabriel Lopes  Edward Harrison  John Knight *  James Martin *  Elias Turner *  George Middleton * 
           
 
 
20/12/1720  24/1/1721  18/2/1721  16/3/1721  19/4/1721  19/5/1721 
           
Mathew Decker  Edward Adderley *  Edward Adderley *  Walter Senserf  Walter Senserf  Conelius  Backer 
Peter Paggen  Conelius  Backer  Conelius  Backer  Conelius  Backer  Conelius  Backer  Joseph Musaphia 
Edward Adderley *  Joseph Musaphia  Walter Senserf  Joseph Musaphia  Joseph Musaphia  Walter Senserf 
Joseph Musaphia  Martin Harold  John Cappes *  Daniel Nathans  Daniel Nathans  James Marye 
Conelius  Backer  Edward Basse  Edward Basse  Gabriel Lopes  Gabriel Lopes  Peter Rivalier 
Martin Harold  Denis Dutry  Daniel Nathans  James Martin *  James Martin *  Gabriel Lopes 
Edward Basse  Francis Pereira  Joseph Musaphia  John Cappes *  John Levett *  Daniel Nathans 
Denis Dutry  Moses Da Medina  Gabriel Lopes  Edward Adderley *  John Cappes *  Abraham Edlin * 
Francis Pereira  Anthony de Costa  John Costa  John Levett *  Abraham Edlin *  James Martin * 
Abraham Edlin *  John Cappes *  Francis Pereira  Abraham Edlin *  James Craggs  John Kellet * 
           
 
Continued on next page.   66 
 
17/6/1721  20/7/1721  17/8/1721  15/9/1721  16/10/1721  15/11/1721 
           
James Marye  James Marye  Joseph Musaphia  Joseph Musaphia  Joseph Musaphia  Salomon de Medina 
Peter Rivalier  Daniel Hayes  Abraham Edlin *  Abraham Dias Fernandes  Salomon de Medina  Henry Isaac 
Daniel Hayes  Conelius  Backer  John Cappes *  Abraham Edlin *  Jaques de Peyrott  Conelius  Backer 
Joseph Musaphia  Robert Westley  Patrick Trehee  Salomon de Medina  Martin Harold  Martin Harold 
Robert Westley  Joseph Musaphia  Conelius  Backer  Martin Harold  Mathew Wymondesold *  James Martin * 
John Cappes *  Henry Furnese  Paul D'Aranda  Jaques de Peyrott  Benjamin Collet  Joseph Musaphia 
Patrick Trehee  John Cappes *  Robert Westley  Francis Pereira  Henry Isaac  Francis Pereira 
Conelius  Backer  Patrick Trehee  Abraham Atkins  Conelius  Backer  Francis Pereira  Mathew Wymondesold * 
Lewis Mendes  Lewis Mendes  Anthony  Mendes  Da Costa  Abraham Atkins  Conelius  Backer  Benjamin Collet 
Robinson Knight *  Robinson Knight *  Moses Blau  Paul D'Aranda  Francis Salvadore  Gabriel Lopes 
Abel Alleyne           





Conelius  Backer 
Henry Isaac 
Joseph Musaphia 
Salomon de Medina 
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Appendix C: The top traders in Bank of England stock CPT, 1719-21 
29/6/1719  29/7/1719  28/8/1719  26/9/1719  17/10/1719  16/11/1719 
           
George Caswall *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  James Martin * 
Robert Westley  Robert Westley  Robert Westley  Thomas Carbonnel *  James Martin *  George Caswall * 
Harbert Springett  Harbert Springett  Thomas Carbonnel *  James Martin *  Edmond Calpot  Robert Westley 
Edward Coull *  James Martin *  Harbert Springett  Robert Westley  Thomas Carbonnel *  Edmond Calpot 
James Martin *  Edward Coull *  James Martin *  Richard Perry  Nathaniel Curson  James Bret 
Nathaniel Shepard *  William Lethieullier  Joseph Shaw  Joseph Shaw  Richard Perry  Henry Cornelisen 
Joseph Moore  Gerard Bolwerke  Joseph Moore  William Heysham  James Bret  Charles Yarnwood 
Gerard Bolwerke  Joseph Moore  Edward Coull *  Charles Yarnwood  Rt Hon Bridget Fauconberg  Richard Japps 
John Eyre  John Marke *  Richard Japps  George Wanley *  Gilles Graafland  Richard Perry 
Samuel Ball  Leonard Smelt  Alexander Gordon *  Edward Coull *  Charles Yarnwood  John Dod 
  John Maddy *         
 
N.B. The lists show in rank order the top traders in BoE stock who facilitated core pass-through (CPT) in the quarter ending on the dates shown at the top of 
each list. Ranks 1 through 10 are listed, with more than 10 persons listed whenever one or more than one individual shares a rank with another. „*‟ denotes a 
member of the GSB-class. 
 
Continued on next page. 
16/12/1719  25/1/1720  24/2/1720  18/3/1720  22/4/1720  24/5/1720 
           
George Caswall *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  John Mead *  George Caswall * 
James Martin *  Robert Westley  James Martin *  John Mead *  George Caswall *  John Mead * 
Robert Westley  James Martin *  Robert Westley  James Martin *  James Martin *  Robert Westley 
Edmond Calpot  John Mead *  John Mead *  Robert Westley  Joseph Wright  James Martin * 
Francis Hawes  Abraham Edlen *  Abraham Edlen *  Abraham Edlen *  Robert Westley  Edward Coull * 
Abraham Edlen *  Francis Hawes  Edward Coull *  Francis Merrett  Conelius  Backer  Francis Merrett 
James Bret  Henry Hoar *  Thomas Snow *  Nathanael Brassey *  Edward Coull *  Nathanael Brassey * 
Henry  Feynham  Edward Coull *  Henry Hoar *  George Wanley *  Peter Geneves  Conelius  Backer 
Edward Coull *  Thomas Snow *  Henry  Feynham  Duke of Buckingham  George Wanley *  Arthur Ogle 
Thomas Snow *  Conrade de Gols  Francis Hawes  Edward Coull *  Abraham Franks  Abraham Craiesteyn 
        Arthur Ogle     68 
 
23/6/1720  23/7/1720  22/8/1720  20/9/1720  21/10/1720  19/11/1720 
           
George Caswall *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  Edward Poulter  Edward Poulter  James Testard * 
James Martin *  James Martin *  Edward Poulter  Peter Delme  William Brassey *  William Brassey * 
Robert Westley  Robert Westley  James Martin *  James Martin *  Peter Delme  George Caswall * 
Moses Hart *  Moses Hart *  Moses Hart *  George Caswall *  George Caswall *  James Martin * 
Edward Coull *  Edward Coull *  Robert Westley  William Brassey *  Robert Westley  Robert Westley 
Lord Bingley  Peter Delme  Peter Delme  William Bance  William Bance  Peter Delme 
Conelius  Backer  Lord Bingley  William Bance  Robert Westley  James Testard *  Gerard Bolwerke 
Johanna Cock *  John Lambert  Francis Pereira  Thomas Paterson  James Martin *  Francis Pereira 
John Mead *  Arthur Ogle  Gerard Bolwerke  Abraham Craiesteyn  Gerard Bolwerke  William Bance 
Peter Delme  Francis Merrett  Abraham Craiesteyn  Justus Beck  Henry Blunt  Henry Blunt 
           
 
 
20/12/1720  24/1/1721  18/2/1721  16/3/1721  19/4/1721  19/5/1721 
           
James Testard *  James Testard *  Barent Gomperts  Robert Westley  Robert Westley  Robert Westley 
Peter Paggen  James Martin *  Robert Westley  Barent Gomperts  Edward Bowman *  Robert Henley 
James Martin *  Barent Gomperts  William Crawley  James Martin *  Barent Gomperts  Edward Bowman * 
William Crawley  Robert Westley  James Martin *  Abraham Atkins  Francis Pereira  Abraham Craiesteyn 
William Brassey *  William Crawley  Francis Pereira  John Robert  James Martin *  Edward des Bouverie 
Peter Delme  Francis Pereira  Peter Delme  Robinson Knight *  Theodore Jacobsen  Barent Gomperts 
Mathew Decker  Peter Delme  Abraham Craiesteyn  Francis Pereira  Hopton Haynes  Francis Pereira 
Barent Gomperts  Abraham Craiesteyn  Denis Dubry  Peter Delme  Peter Seignioret  Peter Seignioret 
Robert Jorhill  Peter Creliius  Salamon de Moseh Pereira  Theodore Jacobsen  John Rudge  Thomas Houghton 
Gerard Bolwerke  Salamon de Moseh Pereira  John Robert  Salamon de Moseh Pereira  Thomas Wentworth  Philip Liege * 
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17/6/1721  20/7/1721  17/8/1721  15/9/1721  16/10/1721  15/11/1721 
           
Moses Hart *  Moses Hart *  Barent Gomperts  Barent Gomperts  Barent Gomperts  Abraham Atkins 
Robert Westley  Robert Westley  Moses Hart *  Edward Coull *  William Northey  William Northey 
Barent Gomperts  Barent Gomperts  Robert Westley  Robert Stokes  Abraham Atkins  Gerard van Neck 
Sarah Stiles  Conelius  Backer  Edward Coull *  Abraham Atkins  Robert Stokes  Robert Westley 
Abraham Craiesteyn  Sarah Stiles  Robert Stokes  James Martin *  Denis Dubry  James Martin * 
Francis Pereira  Abraham Craiesteyn  Conelius  Backer  Robert Westley  Jno. Sherwood *  Barent Gomperts 
Conelius  Backer  Thomas Houghton  James Martin *  Jno. Sherwood *  James Milner  Denis Dubry 
Thomas Houghton  Philip Liege *  John Jacob  Conelius  Backer  Raymon de Smeth  Raymon de Smeth 
Philip Liege *  James Martin *  Charles Laubier  Francis Pereira  John Jacob  Jacob da Costa 
Ralph Dixon  Edward Coull *  Francis Pereira  David Avilar  Francis Pereira  David Avilar 
    Ralph Radcliffe    Benjamin Robinson   






Gerard van Neck 
Robert Westley 
Peter Diharce 
James Martin * 
Robert Aston 
Joseph Barret 
George Caswall * 
Jacob da Costa 
John Costa 
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